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ABSTRACT 
The external indebtedness of many developing countries --
Mexico, Brazil and Argentina in particular -- has been of considerable 
international concern. The debts arose partly because of changes in 
international banking practices and partly because of unwise short-term 
borrowing by governments accustomed to continuing international 
inflation. The problem has been made worse by high world-wide interest 
rates caused in part by the historically high domestic deficits of the 
United States government. There are signs that the crisis may be 
easing, however, and that moderate growth may Boon resume in Latin 
America. 
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In a presentation to the International Relations Section of 
Town Hall in the fall of 1978, I predicted that the price of petroleum 
relative to the prices of other world traded commodities would remain 
more or less constant for the remainder of this century. I had hardly 
uttered these brave words and left the country to work for six months 
with the OEeD in Paris when a short man with a long beard moved from 
Paris to Teheran and supervised a revolution which, among other things, 
induced an almost three fold increase in the world price of petroleum. 
I did predict that "as investments in alternative energy 
sources come on stream and as the high price of petroleum induces some 
conservation, • • the strains on the OPEC carrel will be increased, 
and the pressure on the relative price of petroleum is likely to be 
downward." 
Still, I was not invited back to Town Hall in 1980, 1981, 1982, 
or 1983. Today, as the price of oil is falling while prices of most 
other goods continue to rise, I'm glad to be here again. Nor am I unduly 
chastened by my earlier experience, and, in the interest of offering a 
summary and conclusion in advance for anyone I lose along the way, for 
whatever reason, I hereby predict that headlines about the possible 
default by various developing countries on their external debt will 
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appear less often in the foreseeable future. Argentina remains a 
very troublesome case, but more for political than economic reasons. 
Assuming, as I do, that the deficit of the federal government of the 
United States will decrease, that world-wide inflation will remain 
under control, that real interest rates will fall, and that the dollar 
will decline by enough to induce a better American export-import 
balance without substantially closing American markets to the exports 
of debtor countries, I believe the flow of capital to, and the 
consequent new growth of, many developing countries will recommence. 
Indeed, debtor countries which export manufactured goods may grow 
rapidly in the medium term as changes in exchange rates make their 
exports competitive and an elastic international demand encourages 
growth. 
Let me begin be reviewing a few summary statistics from the 
International Monetary Fund. 
-- The total external debt of all non-communist developing 
countries (excluding the oil exporters of the Persian Gulf and Libya) 
now exceeds $800 billion. This compares with $400 billion in 1978 
and $200 billion in 1974. Of this, just under $100 billion or 12 
percent is short-term debt. This is down from 20 percent in 1982 
and 17 percent in 1978. Fifty seven percent ($460 billion) is owed 
to private institutions. This is up from 51 percent in 1982 and 49 
percent in 1978. 
-- Thirty-Eight percent ($315 billion) is owed by the developing 
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countries of the Western Hemisphere as compared 22 percent ($185 
billion), by the countries of Asia. Roughly $250 billion is owed 
by Mexico, Brazil and Argentina. 
The external debt of all developing countries as a percentage of 
their gross domestic product has risen from 2S percent to 35 
percent since 1978 and stands at a high for the past ten years. 
The external debt of all developing countries has risen as a 
percentage of exports since 1978 from 131 percent to 147 percent, 
though it is down from 154 percent in 1983. 
Of more significance, perhaps, is the sub-group of seven 
countries classified by the International Monetary Fund as Major 
Borrowers each with outstanding indebtedness at the end of 1983 of 
at least $30 billion overall or at least $20 billion to private 
creditors. These seven are Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Korea, 
Mexico, the Phillipines and Venezuela. Four of these are in Latin 
America and are included in all prominent lists of debtors in some 
tro~ble. None of the seven is included in the sub group of low-income 
countries eligible because of their poverty for grant-type World Bank 
IDA assistance. The problem debtor countries tend to be middle-income 
countries which. until 1981. were developing well, some of them 
spectacularly well, and herein lies is a clue to the much publicized 
payments difficulties. 
An analogy can be drawn, it seems to me, between the borrowing 
of a growing country and an expanding business. One expects the debt 
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of a business to grow as its sales and assets grow even though 
individual creditors may be paid off as new debt is incurred. The 
business borrows from its suppliers and from banks to purchase 
short-term assets and from banks and bondholders to purchase long-term 
assets. A proper mix and quantity of assets enables the business to 
increase its sales and, hopefully, its equity -- that fraction of its 
assets not encumbered by debt. A business may become illiquid and have 
trouble paying interest and principal on its debts if, relative to its 
assets, too many of its liabilities are short term. It can have trouble 
paying interest and principle if its sales decline. But borrowing is 
wise so long as the company's assets increase faster than its debt, and 
more borrowing makes sense when the interest rate is low than when it 
is high. 
It makes sense, similarly, for developing countries to borrow 
to finance imports so long as the interest rate on its accumulated debt 
is less than the growth rate of its real gross national product. If 
this criterion is met, the size of the debt should not matter; in the 
case of the developing country, one would expect the external debt to 
grow as the country grows. With rising G. N. P. and rising exports 
relative to its external debt, a country can make the necessary 
payments of interest and principal due and still be better off than if 
it had not borrowed at all. 
If a disproportionate fraction of the principal on past debts 
comes due all at once, however, payment may interfere with imports and, 
therefore, growth. If external borrowing does not finance real growth, 
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repayment must reduce living standards: imports financed by more 
borrowing will postpone but not forever prevent this problem. If the 
export capacity as well as the total production capacity of a debtor 
country does not grow as its external payments increase, debt service 
may require a decrease of imports and, therefore, growth. If the rest 
of the world will not purchase the exports a debtor country has the 
capacity to produce, the same thing may occur. 
So much for generalities. What has happened in fact in the 
real world? Except for the direct investments in other countries 
by private enterprises such as the great international oil companies, 
long-term international capital movements shrank almost to zero in the 
depression and war decades of 1929 to 1948. There was so little long-
term international borrowing and lending that the governments of the 
free world sponsored and subscribed to the World Bank and then to 
regional development banks to stimulate externally financed economic 
development in the low-income less-developed nations of the world. At 
first the Bank found little to do: because it borrowed most of the 
funds it it loaned from private investors, it was obliged to take few 
risks and to investigate carefully the projects it financed. In time, 
it perceived that the poorer credit risk countries were unlikely to 
develop at all if they had to borrow at commercial rates of interest, 
so it established a subsidiary, the International Development 
Association, to make loans to the poorest countries at virtually zero 
rates of interest. This helped development, but questions about the 
rate at which countries could usefully use external finance still had 
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to be answered. By the late '60s, the growth process was sufficiently 
understood so that a growing number of low-income countries were 
developing, the ordering of projects being guided adequately either by 
development plans or by the free market. Inevitably, private lending 
organizations began to be interested in international loans. 
Concurrently, the world of private banking was changing. There 
was the development of the unregulated Euro-currency market and the 
expansion of branch banking, at home and overseas. Foreign branches of 
American banks rose from around 100 in the early 1950s to over 800 by 
1983. A major purpose of these branches was to finance trade and 
investment in the countries in which they are located. Foreign lending 
grew with foreign trade, and competition was fierce. Interest rates 
higher than one percent above the London Inter-Bank offering Rate were 
unusual -- except for loans to governments of newly developing 
countries, where the rewards seemed greater than the risks. 
More recently, the deregulation of banking and the competition 
for deposits has had the effect of raising costs and, therefore, 
interest rates. Bankers have had to worry about keeping depositors as 
well as making sound loans. And inflation has had the effect of 
causing banks to offer loans with shorter maturities. As the Saving 
and Loan Industry discovered in the seventies, it is dangerous for a 
financial institution to have long-term investments yielding relative 
fixed rates of return at the same time that interest rates on deposit 
liabilities are rising. What I am suggesting is that changes in 
banking practices beginning in the late sixties made lending to newly 
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developing countries more attractive, at least for awhile, but they 
also affected interest rates and maturities -- to the detriment of 
borrowing governments. 
Interest rates and export prices matter. By 1976, the external 
debt of eighty-six non-oil exporting less developed countries had 
doubled in four years, but the prices of the exports of these 
developing countries -- on the average -- had also doubled. In real 
terms, the external debt of these countries had increased by only 20 
percent and the real value of their output had also increased by 20 
percent. In spite of oil price increases, the burden of their external 
debt was not increasing. Borrowing to finance development made sense. 
The lending by private American banks (seventy five percent of which in 
1976 was guaranteed against default by the United States government) 
seemed also to make sense because loans were made for the most part to 
middle-income developing countries such as Brazil, whose real G. N. P. 
more than doubled during the decade of the seventies while. between 
1957 and 1970, industrial production grew by 8.4 percent a year. It is 
har~ to find fault with the international lending of private American 
banks during the early and middle seventies. There was some concern 
during the recession of 1974-75 as United States imports from less 
developed countries fell drastically, but by 1977 all seemed well 
again. Then, slowly at first but rapidly beginning in 1981. things 
seemed to go awry. 
Between 1978 and 1984, the external debt of all developing 
countries doubled, and the ratio of external debt to G. N. P. rose from 
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25 to 35 percent. For major borrowers, the debt to export ratio rose 
from 199 to 238 percent while the debt to G. N. P. ratio went from 20 
to 48 percent. As we all know, some of the major borrowers seemed to 
be in over their heads. What went wrong? 
I believe the answer is two fold: the domestic economic 
policies of some borrowing countries, particularly some in the Western 
Hemisphere, were unsound, particularly in a world of disinflation; and 
the disinflation brought about in the United States by high real 
interest rates and a deep recession created problems for the rest of 
the world which will be alleviated only gradually over the next half 
decade or so. But these problems are not different in kind from the 
problems of the oil drillers in Oklahoma who borrowed too much in 
anticipation of higher energy prices and brought down the Penn Square 
Bank and almost the Continental Illinois; or the mid-western farmers 
now stuck with declining land, and depressed grain, prices; or the real 
estate speculators who borrowed from Crocker Bank and paid too much for 
land. 
Let me speak about the problem of disinflation. When world 
prices were rising at a percentage rate which exceeded interest rates 
-- as they did during much of the seventies, borrowers could pay 
interest and principal at a discount so to speak. In some years, the 
effective interest rate was less than zero. Just as it paid a 
speculator to borrow at 10 percent to buy a house which could be sold 
in a year with more than a 10 percent net appreciation, it paid Mexico 
to borrow at 10 percent to buy oil drilling or refining equipment if, 
during or the lifetime of the equipment, the world price of oil 
continued to increase annually by more than 10 percent. 
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In the seventies, the prices of exports (and imports), kept 
rising by enough to offset interest rates, so borrowing made a great 
deal of sense. Specifically, from 1973 to 1980 the value of the 
exports of developing countries grew at 21 percent per year while 
international interest rates averaged 10 percent. Since 1981, export 
prices have risen at a rate lower than prevailing interest rates, and 
the volume of exports had declined. In 1981 and 1982, the value of 
world exports increased by a mere 1 percent while world interest rates 
averaged 16 percent. In such a period it makes less sense to borrow, 
and it becomes a great deal more difficult for a debtor to earn the 
foreign exchange needed to amortize and to pay interest on past 
borrowing. 
In 1980, it took 19 percent of the exports of Latin America to 
earn the foreign exchange needed to pay interest on external debt; by 
1982 it took 35 percent. In fact, in 1982, amortization and interest 
pa~ents on past debts amounted to over half of Latin American exports, 
this in comparison with a debt service ratio of only 11.2 percent for 
Asian debtors and 11 percent for debtor countries in Africa, Europe and 
the Middle East. This explains why outright defaults by some Latin 
American debtors, at least on interest payments, would certainly have 
occurred in 1982 had special measures not been worked out by the 
International Monetary Fund, the United States Treasury Department and 
the great commercial banks of Europe, Japan and the United States. 
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Without getting into an extended discussion with political 
overtones at this point, let me just say that, in my judgment, the 
American disinflation of the 1980-84 period could have been engineered 
with a great less pain both nationally and internationally if personal 
income tax cuts had not been enacted and if monetary policy had been 
allowed on that account to combat inflation in the context of lower 
interest rates. It has been estimated that a 1 percent increase in 
American interest rates adds $2.5 billion to the annual interest 
payments which must be made by Western Hemisphere debtor governments. 
Let me turn now to the borrowers. What did the governments of 
Mexico, Brazil and Argentina, the most notorious debtors, do wrong? 
One thing they all did wrong was to permit their currencies to become 
overvalued in exchange markets at one time or another -- most of the 
time, actually, after 1980. Overvalued currencies induced a level of 
imports which could not be sustained even with a continuation of 
external borrowing at a constant real ratio. They also encouraged 
uneconomic exports of capital -- by wealthy Mexicans, for example, who 
bought American real estate -- and, as the overvaluation became 
obvious, they induced a flight of capital which seriously reduced 
foreign currency reserves otherwise available to service external debt. 
The Mexican case is the simplest to understand. The sharp 
increase in oil prices in 1979 and 1980 gave the Mexican government 
overconfidence in future growth rates and in the extent to which Mexico 
could prudently borrow to finance the expansion of the petroleum and 
other industries. The resulting increase in aggregate demand produced 
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domestic inflation at a rate more than twice that in the United States. 
The peso was allowed gradually to decline but it remained overvalued 
until, on February 18, 1982, it was allowed to float quickly down to 
the level of 45 to the dollar. Meanwhile, the interest rate on its 
external debt had risen, exports had declined, and the internal public 
sector deficit reached 15 percent of C.N.P. The era of rapid growth of 
output, employment and per-capita income suddenly ceased, and, though 
austerity is now making it possible for Mexico to service a 
restructured external debt (Mexico's imports from the United States 
fell by $10 billion in 1982), a resumption of rapid growth now seems 
unlikely for some years. 
The case of Brazil is not a great deal more complicated. 
Brazil is a net oil importer. In an effort to sustain continued high 
growth after the major oil price increases of 1973 and 1979, Brazil 
increased its external borrowing. Brazil's external debt rose from $10 
billion in 1973 to $47 billion in 1979 and nearly $100 billion today. 
From a very nearly balanced current account in 1972. Brazil moved to a 
$12,billion current account deficit in 1980: increases in imports and 
interest payments on Brazil's external debt more than offset the growth 
of exports. By the end of 1982. Brazil had exhausted its international 
reserves, and suspension of interest and amortization payments on 
external debt became a very real possibility. At this point the U. S. 
Treasury, the Bank for International Settlements and a small group of 
commercial banks provided Brazil with stop-gap funds while the 
International Monetary Fund and private banks arranged new medium term 
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loans and the rollover (renewal) of existing loans coming due. The 
total package amounted to $20 billion, temporarily saving the 
day, but raising Brazil's interest payments without affecting the 
underlying problems of trade and growth. In an effort to free 
resources for use in the foreign-trade sector, the government has cut 
subsidies, real aggregate demand has fallen as has employment -- by 
more than 15 percent since 1981. But with domestic inflation high and 
rising, the cruzero must fall more than it has. Meanwhile, the 
$10 billion per year interest due on Brazil's external debt cannot be 
financed by an export surplus of $7 billion, and the current $7 billion 
export surplus is due more to a decline of imports than an increase of 
exports. So borrowing continues. 
Inflation in Argentina had fallen to 50 percent a year in 1979, 
the government deficit to 3 percent of G. N. P. Then, as oil prices 
increased and public spending, largely military, soared, the government 
deficit soared. By 1983 it had risen to 14 percent of G. N. P. 
Inflation increased, and the devaluation of the peso continued apace, 
though rarely by enough to stay ahead of inflation; and the flight of 
capital rose so much that, for all practical purposes, new external 
borrowing went to finance private capital outflows. Unlike Mexico and 
Brazil, Argentina had had little growth in the 'seventies. Indeed, by 
mid-1982, industrial output had fallen to the levels of the 'sixties. 
Argentina's external debt was near $36 billion, more than half of it 
short term, and annual interest payments were $4.5 billion. After the 
Falklands, a historically rich and potentially richer country was as 
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near bankruptcy as a country is likely to be insofar as the term 
bankruptcy can be applied to a country. As with Mexico and Brazil, 
Argentina was bailed out of its immediate crisis by the loans and 
cooperation of the International Monetary Fund and leading commercial 
banks. 
Have Mexico, Brazil and Argentina and, for that matter, 
Venezuela, Peru and Chile borrowed too much abroad? As of 1982 and 
'83, obviously yes: without new loans, they could not have avoided 
outright default on annual interest and amortization payments. But are 
they unsolvent or illiquid? Were they more like the Penn Square Bank 
or the Chrysler Corporation? I believe they are more like the Chrysler 
Foundation: given time, they ~ sell more; they can service their 
debts and resume their economic growth. As the Manufactures Hanover 
Trust Company -- a not altogether disinterested party -- recently 
pointed out, the six high-debt Latin countries boosted their aggregate 
trade surplus from less than $3 billion in 1981 to nearly $30 billion 
in 1973. Unfortunately, from the point of view of growth and living 
sta9dards in the debtor countries only $2 billion of this improvement 
came from an increase in exports; $25 billion came from a decrease in 
imports, largely from the United States. Still, the dangers of 
outright default are considerably less than they were two years ago 
except, perhaps, in Argentina where inflation is raging out of control 
at an annual rate of 1,000 percent and more and more prices are being 
quoted in dollars rather than pesos. Argentina is becoming like 
Germany in the early 'twenties where the money supply fell relative to 
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G. N. P. because the transactions velocity of circulation rose causing 
and being caused by hyperinflation. In Germany the hyperinflation was 
solved by massive foreign loans, by a reduction of government spending 
as a fraction of G. N. P. and an increase of taxes. The International 
Monetary Fund is trying to induce a similar solution in Argentina, but 
the newly elected government may be too weak for the task. 
Unemployment is already high, and it is likely to rise further if 
government spending is reduced. It may be that an incomes policy as 
used in Mexico will be needed in Argentina if inflation is to be 
brought under control. 
New loans to repay old loans are needed across the board, just 
as they were needed by the Chrysler Corporation. Nearly 53 percent of 
the external debt of the six major Latin American debtor nations has a 
one year maturity and must be rolled over. Lest you cringe at this 
statistic, however, I must quickly add that, according to Manufacturer's 
Hanover Trust, 48 percent of Corporate America's debt and 34 percent of 
U. S. government debt has a one year maturity. 
More lending is needed in the sort run and an increase in 
exports is needed in the longer run. Thus, it is desperately important 
that the United States not deny the exports of developing countries, 
even if those exports are subsidized. A few of you may remember the 
absurdity of the early 1930s when the United States reduced its 
imports so low that the rest of the world, even if it had bought nothing 
from the United States, could not have earned enough dollars to service 
outstanding dollar debts. Let's hope such a situation doesn't happen 
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again. 
A decrease in American interest rates will help a great deal. 
and I rather expect American interest rates to continue to decline, at 
least in the short run. Real interest rates in the United States have 
fluctuated between an abnormally high seven and ten percent since 
September, 1981. As expectations of new inflation subside, however, 
real interest rates will surely decline in spite of the historically 
high deficit of the federal government. If the deficit could be 
substantially reduced, real interest rates could be expected to decline 
even more. As American interest rates decline, the dollar will 
probably decline, and this will reduce the foreign currency import 
costs not only of American goods but of dollar-priced middle-eastern 
petroleum as well. Foreign exports will earn more dollars per unit. 
Of course American exporters will be more competitive, but in economics 
its hard to have everything go right the same time! 
I am optimistic. I hope you are too and that we are all right. 
